Income Smoothing and Earnings Informativeness by Tudor, A. (Alexandra)
 62 
Income Smoothing and Earnings 
Informativeness 
 
 
A matter of institutional characteristics or accounting standards? 
 
 
Alexandra Tudor1 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This study investigates the level of income smoothing and its impact on the 
informativeness of earnings.  The main contribution of this research is that as well IFRS as 
investor protection are considered to examine the association between income smoothing 
and earnings informativeness. Income smoothing is measured as the variation in net 
income relative to the variation in operating cash flows. A returns-earnings regression 
based on Zarowin (2002) is used to measure earnings informativeness. A sample of listed 
companies from United Kingdom (strong investor protection), France and the Netherlands 
(weak investor protection) is chosen. The results suggest that companies in United 
Kingdom show less smooth earnings compared to companies in France and the Netherlands. 
In addition I find that firms smooth income to a higher degree in the period after IFRS. 
Moreover income smoothing improves earnings informativeness during the pre IFRS period 
for all sample companies, and to a higher degree in the United Kingdom, although not 
significant. Subsequently to IFRS adoption the results suggest that income smoothing 
decreases earnings informativeness in all countries. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5605. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Income smoothing is a form of earnings management and is generally defined as the 
dampening of fluctuations in reported earnings over time (Ronen and Yaari 2008, 317). In 
other words, management is inclined to take actions to increase earnings when earnings 
are relatively low and to decrease earnings when earnings are relatively high. The main 
reasons that managers smooth earnings are: maximizing their own wealth, reducing the 
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perceived riskiness of the firm, enhancing firm value, meeting debt covenants, reducing 
tax and political costs and enhancing the reliability of financial forecasts. 
Although there is evidence that income smoothing takes place, its effect on earnings 
informativeness is largely unknown. Hereby is earnings informativeness defined as “the 
amount of information about future earnings or cash flows included in current period 
stock return” (Zarowin 2002, 4). The literature hypothesizes two opposite effects of 
income smoothing (Zarowin 2002, Tucker and Zarowin 2006). One viewpoint is that income 
smoothing results in altered information and thus less informative stock prices. On the 
other hand income smoothing through efficient communication of private information 
about the firm’s future expectations can lead to more informative stock prices.  
This study investigates the relation between income smoothing and earnings 
informativeness in three different countries: UK, France and Netherlands. To compare 
between countries, the institutional infrastructure of the three countries has to be 
considered. The most relevant considered institutional factor here is investor protection, 
which is about how well the law protects shareholders against expropriation by managers 
(Cahan et al. 2008).  
Income smoothing is assumed to take place through accounting choices. These choices in 
turn are dependent on the applied accounting standards. Therefore the set of accounting 
rules companies need to comply with, should be considered. As of January 1, 2005, 
companies listed in the European Union are required to present their consolidated financial 
statements applying International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These new 
standards aim to improve comparability of companies across countries.  
In this research I attempt to provide an answer to the following research questions: 
 
What is the impact of IFRS on the level of income smoothing and its relation with 
earnings informativeness? 
 
What is the impact of investor protection on the level of income smoothing and its 
relation with earnings informativeness? 
 
Each country’s sample consists of two periods, pre IFRS and post IFRS. I measure the 
degree of income smoothing as the ratio between the variation in net income and variation 
in operating cash flows (Zarowin 2002). The relation between income smoothing and 
earnings informativeness is given in a returns – earnings regression based on Zarowin (2002) 
and Tucker and Zarowin (2006).  
I predict that the level of income smoothing will be higher in all three countries after IFRS 
adoption, since IFRS allows managers with more discretion. Companies in France and 
Netherlands, as weak investor protection countries, are expected to show higher levels of 
income smoothing during both periods. 
The relation between income smoothing and earnings informativeness is predicted to be 
positive prior to IFRS for all three countries, with a stronger effect for UK, which is 
characterized by strong investor protection. After IFRS, the relation between income 
smoothing and earnings informativeness is expected to be weaker than in the first period 
for France and Netherlands and stronger for UK.  
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The association between income smoothing and earnings informativeness is important for 
policy makers as it relates to the ability of firms to manage earnings (Zarowin 2002, 4). 
This ability can be influenced by institutional factors (Leuz et al. 2003, Cahan et al. 2008) 
and accounting standards (Barth et al. 2008, Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). I contribute to 
the body of international research by taking both the effects of IFRS and investor 
protection into account when investigating income smoothing and earnings 
informativeness.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides a comprehensive 
literature review. In chapter 3 the hypotheses are developed and research design is 
presented. Chapter 4 describes the empirical results and in the end chapter 5 provides a 
summary and conclusions of this study.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Income smoothing and informativeness 
 
2.1.1 Definition 
Ronen and Sadan (1981, 2) define income smoothing as “a deliberate attempt by 
management to signal information to financial users”. In an earlier work the definition is 
“the deliberate dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings which is 
considered to be normal for the firm” (Barnea et al. 1976, 110).  
A more recent depiction is “to characterize income smoothing as earnings management, 
we need to define the point at which managers’ accrual decisions result in “too much” 
smoothing and so become earnings management” (Dechow and Skinner 2000, 238). 
Basically income smoothing is the reduction of the variance in periodic profit over time to 
the extent allowed by accounting and management principles.  
 
2.1.2  Earnings informativeness 
Efficient income smoothing can improve the informativeness of a firm’s current and past 
earnings about future earnings and cash flows. Earnings informativeness (or stock price 
informativeness) is defined by Zarowin (2002, 4) as “the amount of information about 
future earnings or future cash flows impounded in the current period stock return.” 
Resource allocation can be improved if stock prices include more information through 
income smoothing (Zarowin 2002, 3).  
When making discretionary accounting choices managers consider expected future earnings 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1995, 77). Tucker and Zarowin (2006, 253) categorize the managers’ 
use of reporting discretion as either (a) garbling or (b) efficient communication of private 
information. The authors argue that if income smoothing is garbling, then the resulting 
earnings are less informative about future earnings. When income smoothing is used to 
communicate private information about future performance expectations, it could provide 
more information about future earnings and cash flows. This last argument is the one I use 
further in this master thesis. 
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2.1.3  The relation between income smoothing and earnings informativeness 
Although the effect of income smoothing on earnings informativeness is not thoroughly 
investigated, the accounting literature so far theorizes two opposite effects of income 
smoothing on earnings informativeness according to Zarowin (2002, 4) and Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006, 253). One viewpoint is that managers use income smoothing to make public 
their private information about the firm’s future earnings (Ronen and Sadan 1981, Chaney 
and Lewis 1995, Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Here income smoothing results in more 
information about future earnings and cash flows, which in turn is reflected in the stock 
prices. Alternative findings suggest that income smoothing alters information and makes 
stock prices less informative. Less information about future earnings and cash flows will be 
reflected in the stock prices, making smoothing harmful (Tucker and Zarowin 2006, 253).  
 
2.1.4  Income smoothing improving the value relevance2 of earnings 
The study of Hunt et al. (2000) investigates whether earnings smoothing through 
discretionary accruals improves or deteriorates the informativeness of earnings. The 
findings suggest that both discretionary and nondiscretionary accrual accounting practices 
increase the informativeness of earnings. Further the results support the informativeness 
hypothesis, namely that managers smooth income to convey their private information. 
Here, Hunt et al. (2000, 8) refer to the study of Chaney and Lewis (1995), which also 
stated that only managers have private information about future earnings and therefore 
smooth income.  
 
The study of Zarowin (2002) introduces a new approach by focusing on the relation 
between current stock prices and future information in a cross-sectional setting. Zarowin 
(2002, 4) defines stock price informativeness as “the amount of information about future 
earnings and cash flows that is reflected in current period stock returns”. This notion is 
measured as the coefficient on future earnings (FERC) in the regression of current stock 
return on current and future earnings.  
Regressions of stock returns against lagged, current and one year ahead earnings or cash 
flows and accruals, provide evidence that increased smoothing is associated with increased 
earnings informativeness. Thus firms with stock returns including more information about 
future earnings and cash flows have higher stock price informativeness.  
 
The study of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) is more recent, and the approach used is closely 
related to Zarowin (2002). The authors believe that a firm has certain information about 
future earnings when current earnings are realized, because of the continuous business 
cycle. Then the reporting behaviour and the stock price reveal this information.  
The research of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) provides evidence of more informative stock 
prices when firms smooth income, with stock prices of higher-smoothing firms more 
informative than lower-smoothing firms. Again, this is evidence that firms use discretion in 
reporting standards to make public information about future earnings and cash flows. 
 
 
                                             
2 The term value relevance is used for earnings informativeness 
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2.1.5  Income smoothing as “garbling” 
The second viewpoint in the income smoothing literature is that managers use their 
reporting discretion to “garble” earnings according to Tucker and Zarowin (2006, 253).  
Sloan (1996) investigates whether information about future earnings is fully reflected in 
the stock prices. This information is assumed to be contained in accruals and cash flows. In 
a regression of future abnormal returns on earnings, evidence is found that stock prices fail 
to anticipate the lower persistence of earnings impounded in accruals.  
 
The research of Beneish and Nichols (2005) expands on Sloan (1996) by examining the role 
of earnings management in relation with the market pricing of accruals more thoroughly. 
The results suggest that when the probability of managed earnings is high, positive 
earnings are less persistent than negative earnings. This is in contradiction with investors’ 
expectations that firms which manipulate earnings have higher future earnings. 
Subsequently the authors argue that earnings management is misleading.  
 
 
 2.2 Institutional characteristics 
 
2.2.1 Investor protection 
The notion of investor protection is defined by Cahan et al. (2008, 3) as “how well 
investors are protected by law from expropriation by managers and controlling 
shareholders of firms”. Insiders (managers) have the incentive to act in their own interest 
(opportunism), to obscure private control benefits and not reporting the true firm 
performance. An example is overstating earnings. When outside investors detect this 
behaviour, they will try to take actions against the insiders according to Leuz et al. (2003, 
506). Investors are protected by law and regulation, which can differ across countries. 
Insiders are less intended to act opportunistically when investors are better protected. 
Here the distinction is made between strong investor protection and weak investor 
protection countries. This distinction is based on characteristics of a country’s legal 
system, legal enforcement, shareholder rights, equity market importance, ownership 
concentration and disclosure requirements (Leuz et al. 2003, following La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998).  
 
2.2.2 The relation between investor protection, income smoothing and 
earnings informativeness 
A study defining earnings management as managers’ opportunistic behaviour and thus 
misleading is the research of Leuz et al. (2003, 506). Managers have the incentive to 
conceal true firm performance. The extent of their discretion depends on the accounting 
rules in a country and the legal system. Institutional characteristics are also taken into 
account. The results suggest that income smoothing is more persistent in weak investor 
protection countries. 
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The study of Cahan et al. (2008) investigates whether earnings informativeness due to 
income smoothing is related to the institutional infrastructure of a country. They use the 
approach of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) to measure earnings informativeness. This study 
focuses on the positive effects of income smoothing, managers communicating their 
private information about firm’s future expectations. 
The legal enforcement index based on La Porta et al. (1998) is used to measure investor 
protection. Legal enforcement is considered to be a good indication because laws are 
ineffective if they are not enforced. The findings suggest that income smoothing is more 
pervasive in countries with weak investor protection. Consequently income smoothing in 
countries with strong investor protection improves earnings informativeness to a higher 
extent than in countries with weak investor protection. Opportunism is associated with low 
investor protection while the communication of private information is related to strong 
investor protection. While there is less income smoothing in strong investor protection 
countries, its effect on informativeness is stronger than in countries with weak investor 
protection. Thus the efficient communication use of income smoothing predominates the 
use for opportunistic purposes.  
 
2.2.3 The introduction of IFRS 
As of January 1, 2005, all companies listed in the European Union are required to apply 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when preparing their consolidated 
financial statements. IFRS are accounting standards issued by an independent body in 
Europe, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).   
With the introduction of IFRS, standards are more principle based. More general principles 
rather than detailed rules are developed. Associated with the principle based approach of 
IFRS is fair value accounting, which is defined in IAS 39 as: “the amount for which an 
assets could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties 
in an arm’s length transaction” (IFRSs in your pocket 2009, 98). Fair value accounting 
differs from historical cost accounting in that it requires estimates based on market prices, 
which are not always observable (Ball 2006) and thus subject of management judgement. 
With the introduction of IFRS, many international differences in accounting standards are 
about to disappear. Harmonization will be the result, which improves the comparability of 
companies across countries. To achieve this, consistent appliance of IFRS across countries 
is necessary. The IASB is a standard setter and not a regulator. Implementation of the 
standards is primarily the responsibility of managers, auditors and local regulators in each 
country (Ball 2006). 
 
2.2.4 IFRS, earnings management and earnings informativeness 
The introduction of one single set of accounting standards in the European Union is 
supposed to increase uniformity and comparability. Increased uniformity goes together 
with reduced managers’ discretion, as concluded by Palepu et al. (2007).  
For instance, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) compare voluntary adoption of IFRS 
with German GAAP during 1999-2001. They find no significant difference in the level of 
earnings management.   
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Barth et al. (2008) investigate whether the degree of earnings management changes after 
voluntary adoption of international standards during 1994-2003, in a cross country study. 
They conclude that the level of income smoothing is lower for companies applying 
international standards. Also they find a higher association between net income and stock 
returns, which is evidence of earnings being more informative.  
The study of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) examines the consequences of the introduction 
of IFRS on earnings management in UK, France and Australia.  It is argued that IFRS 
“provides firm with substantial discretion” (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008, 484). Earnings 
management is found to be higher after IFRS adoption in France and remaining stable in UK 
and Australia. The explanation given is that countries have different institutional 
characteristics.  
 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) attempt to find an explanation for the mixed results in prior 
research on the consequences of IFRS adoption for accounting quality. They argue that 
accounting quality not only depends on the accounting standards applied but also on a 
country’s legal and political system and financial reporting incentives. Accounting standard 
setting is primarily influenced by government in code law countries and private 
organizations in common law countries. Differences in legal enforcement across countries 
also play a role.  
 
 
3. Hypothesis development and research design 
After 2005 listed companies in Europe are required to apply IFRS. These standards follow a 
principle based approach and fair value accounting which requires more subjective 
judgement.   
Paananen and Lin (2008) report that income smoothing behaviour increased after IFRS 
adoption in Germany. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) provide evidence of more earnings 
management after IFRS introduction in France. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1: After the introduction of IFRS, firms in UK, France and Netherlands smooth income to 
a higher degree than during pre IFRS period. 
 
Certain studies investigated the level of income smoothing across countries, by taking 
investor protection into consideration (e.g. Cahan et al. 2008, Leuz et al. 2003). Their 
findings suggest that income smoothing is more pervasive in countries where shareholders 
are less protected by law and regulations. Following these results, I deduce the next 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Income smoothing is lower in countries with strong investor protection regimes.  
 
Keeping in mind that UK is a strong investor protection country and France and 
Netherlands have weaker investor protection based on proxies of La Porta et al. (1998) and 
the fact that I investigate two time periods, the following sub hypotheses are developed: 
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a: During pre IFRS adoption period income smoothing is higher in France and Netherlands 
compared to UK. 
b: During post IFRS adoption period income smoothing is higher in France and Netherlands 
compared to UK. 
 
When managers use income smoothing to communicate private information about future 
earnings, this information will be revealed in the stock price (Tucker and Zarowin 2006). 
Other studies argue that the effect of income smoothing on earnings informativeness also 
depends on the country’s legal origin. Cahan et al. (2008) conclude that in strong investor 
protection countries income smoothing leads to more informative earnings. This is due to 
the fact that managers in these countries have high incentives to smooth earnings in order 
to reveal information to the market.   
Assuming that the first hypothesis is true, and considering previous evidence about income 
smoothing improving earnings informativeness in strong investor protection countries, I 
have the same expectation about firms in UK. 
 
H3: After the adoption of IFRS, income smoothing improves earnings informativeness to a 
higher extent than during the pre IFRS adoption period for firms in UK. 
 
In contradiction to high investor protection, weak investor protection allows for more 
discretion. In this case the managerial intendancy to manipulate earnings aggravates 
according to Hung (2001). The author also suggests that the positive effect of income 
smoothing on value relevance of earnings is attenuated in low investor protection 
economies. This is because in those countries, managers are believed to smooth income for 
opportunistic reasons, according to Cahan et al. (2008). Income smoothing is then 
considered to cause earnings to be noisier and thus less informative Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006). 
Considering the fact that France and Netherlands are characterized by weak investor 
protection, the next hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
H4: After IFRS adoption, income smoothing improves earnings informativeness to a lower 
extent than during the pre IFRS period for firms in France and Netherlands.   
 Sample data 
The aim of my study is to compare two groups of countries with different institutional 
characteristics prior to IFRS adoption and after the IFRS adoption. I choose listed 
companies from France and the Netherlands (French origin) on the one side and United 
Kingdom (English origin) on the other side. UK is a strong investor protection country while 
France and the Netherlands display a lower level of investor protection. Besides UK has a 
common law system, while France and the Netherlands are code law countries. The 
judgement on the strength of the investor protection system is based on the scores for the 
investor protection proxies (proxies from La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, used by Leuz et al. 
2003).  
I use annual, firm level data for my research from the databases Worldscope (Thomson One 
Banker) and Datastream. The regressions will be estimated for two sample periods: pre 
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IFRS adoption (2002 – 2004) and post IFRS adoption (2006 – 2008). The base years will be 
2003 and 2007 respectively. 
An overview of the sample construction is provided in table 1, after the missing 
observations are left out. For the final samples: financial firms are excluded, because of 
their different accounting practices.  
 
Table 1 Sample 
Country Pre IFRS Post IFRS 
France 363 241 
The 
Netherlands 
82 78 
UK 642 253 
Total 1.087 572 
 
Methodology 
 
 Income smoothing measure 
Income smoothing is measured by variation in net income relative to the variation in 
operating cash flows: σNI/σCFO. A lower relative variation in net income is evidence of 
income smoothing (Zarowin 2002). To estimate the income smoothing measure for 2003 
(pre IFRS, base year), data about net income and operating cash flows for the years 2001, 
2002, and 2003 is needed. Similar, the smoothing measure of 2007 (post IFRS, base year) 
requires data from 2005, 2006, 2007.  
An income smoothing ranking is employed by Zarowin (2002) to control for industry and 
time effects. I choose a similar way of ranking, with a small modification. The smoothing 
variable IS is determined as the fractional ranking of income smoothing and takes values 
between 0 and 1. The fractional ranking is the raw rank minus 1 divided to the number of 
observations minus 1. An example: The firms are arranged according to the σNI/ σCFO from 
low smoothing to high and suppose there are 100 firms totally. The highest smoothing firm 
has raw rank 100, which results in a fractional ranking of (100-1)/(100-1) = 1, for the 
second highest smoothing firm it will be (99-1)/(100-1) = 0,989. A higher value indicates 
more income smoothing and thus a higher rank.  
 
 Earnings informativeness measure 
The relation between stock returns and future earnings is measured by the future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC). This is the coefficient on future earnings in a regression of 
current stock return on current and future earnings. The model of Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006) requires a longer sample period, since three years ahead of earnings and returns are 
included in the regression. Zarowin (2002) restricts the sample period, by taking only one 
year ahead of earnings and returns in consideration. I choose this last approach, since my 
sample period after IFRS is limited. Besides like Zarowin (2002, 13) argues, if there is an 
association between income smoothing and earnings informativeness it is more likely to be 
discovered in the next year than in the second or third year. 
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Main model 
To provide evidence on hypothesis 3 and 4, the effect of income smoothing on the relation 
between stock return and future earnings has to be examined. This will be achieved, by 
applying the next regression based on Zarowin (2002): 
 
Rt = b0 + b1EPSt-1 + b2EPSt + b3EPSt+1 + b4Rt+1 + b5ISt + b6ISt * EPSt-1 +  b7ISt * EPSt + b8ISt * EPSt+1 
+ b9ISt * Rt+1 + εt  
 
Where:  
Rt  = the current annual stock return in year t 
EPSt-1  = the earnings per share for year t-1, deflated by the stock price at the beginning 
of year t 
EPSt  = the earnings per share for year t, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of 
year t 
EPSt+1 = the earnings per share in the year t+1, deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of year t 
Rt+1 = the stock return for year t+1 
 
The earnings per share variables are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends and 
excluding extraordinary items. The FERC is represented by b3, and is predicted to be 
positive. The higher this coefficient the more information about future earnings is included 
in the current stock price. The coefficient on current earnings, b2 is also predicted to be 
positive and higher than b3.The coefficient on past earnings is predicted to be negative. 
The coefficient on ISt * EPSt+1, b8, is expected to be positive if income smoothing results in 
more information about future earnings (since a higher ranking means more smoothing). In 
contrast when income smoothing is considered as garbling then b8 is predicted to be 
negative. In that case current stock returns contain less information about future earnings. 
This regression will be estimated for each country twice, before IFRS and after IFRS 
adoption.   
 
4. Empirical results and analysis 
4.1 The degree of income smoothing 
 
UK  
From performed sample statistics it follows that the mean σNI/σCFO amounts 2,147 during 
pre IFRS and 1,350 after IFRS. A lower ratio indicates a higher degree of income smoothing. 
In fact the ratio should be less than 1 for income smoothing firms (Zarowin 2002). When I 
take a look at the absolute values of the σNI/σCFO ratio, then I conclude that 305 from the 
622 UK firms (49%) have a ratio lower than 1, which is evidence of income smoothing. For 
the post IFRS period 155 from 239 companies (65%) show a lower variation in net income 
relative to the variation in operating cash flows. The difference in the mean values 
together with the decrease in the absolute values suggests that firms in UK smooth income 
to a higher degree after IFRS adoption.  
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To confirm this establishment, the Mann-Whitney test is performed. This is a non 
parametric test that allows comparing two independent samples, which do not satisfy the 
condition of normally distributed data. The actual Mann-Whitney statistic is the U3.  
The results of the Mann-Whitney test for UK are given in table 2. 
 
Table 2 Mann-Whitney test results pre IFRS UK vs. post IFRS UK  
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Period N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks  σNI/σCFO 
Pre IFRS 621 452,41 280.946,00 Mann-Whitney U 60.604,000 
Post IFRS 239 373,57 89.284,00 Wilcoxon W 89.284,000 
Total 860   Z -4,169 
σNI/σCFO 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 
     a. Grouping Variable: Period 
 
The lower mean rank in the post IFRS period means that there are more lower values of 
the ratio σNI/σCFO, than in the pre IFRS period. The difference between these means is 
significant. From previous statements I conclude that firms in UK smooth income to a 
higher degree after adoption of IFRS, which confirms that hypothesis 1 is proven true for 
UK. 
 
France 
The mean income smoothing ratio (σNI/σCFO) is 1,097 in the pre IFRS period and 0,987 after 
IFRS adoption. Again, the mean ratio is lower after adoption of IFRS. In addition it takes a 
value lower than 1. For the absolute values of smoothing firms I find that about 66% in the 
pre IFRS period and 71% during the period after IFRS introduction have a ratio below 1. 
Also here the Mann-Whitney test is performed. 
 
Table 3 Mann-Whitney test results pre IFRS France vs. post IFRS France 
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Period N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks  σNI/σCFO 
Pre IFRS 346 291,77 100.954,00 Mann-Whitney U 39.003,000 
Post IFRS 231 284,84 65.799,00 Wilcoxon W 65.799,000 
Total 577   Z -0,489 
σNI/σCFO 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,625 
     a. Grouping Variable: Period 
 
The Mann-Whitney test designates that the mean rank is lower after IFRS, but the 
difference is not significant (1-tailed significance 0,625/2 = 0,313). However, there is still 
an indication that companies in France smooth income more after adoption of IFRS. Thus 
hypothesis 1 is considered to be true for France. 
 
 
 
                                             
3 U=N1N2 + (N1 * (N1+1))/2 – R1, where N1 and N2 are the sample sizes of the two groups and R1 is the sum of 
ranks of the first group.  
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The Netherlands 
As for UK and France, for Netherlands the mean σNI/σCFO ratio is also smaller subsequent to 
IFRS adoption. The mean value is 1,550 in the first period with respect to 1,237 in the 
second period. Prior to IFRS, approximately 59% companies show a ratio indicating income 
smoothing practices. After IFRS the percentage grows up to 76%. This is consistent with the 
results of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), which also find evidence of increased earnings 
management in France. 
 
Table 4 Mann-Whitney test results pre IFRS Netherlands vs. post IFRS Netherlands 
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Period N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks  σNI/σCFO 
Pre IFRS 78 82,97 6.472,00 Mann-Whitney U 2.537,000 
Post IFRS 76 71,88 5.463,00 Wilcoxon W 5.463,000 
Total 154   Z -1,543 
σNI/σCFO 
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,123 
     a. Grouping Variable: Period 
 
In the table 4 the results of the Mann-Whitney test are presented. The mean rank is lower 
in the second period, thus the income smoothing ratio is lower over the whole period, 
significant at 10% level (1-tailed significance 0,123/2 = 0,061). There is evidence that 
companies smooth income to a larger degree after appliance of IFRS standards. Thus the 
prediction made in hypothesis 1 is considered true for Netherlands. 
 
Comparison between France, the Netherlands and UK 
France and Netherlands have weaker investor protection than UK. The legal environment 
of a country is predicted to influence the degree of managers’ discretion in a country.  
 
Pre IFRS 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is similar to the Mann-Whitney, it is based on ranks, and performs 
well with not normally distributed data. In addition, the Kruskal-Wallis can be used to test 
for differences among more than two groups, which is the case here, since I want to 
compare the mean of σNI/σCFO for UK, France and the Netherlands.  The results of this test 
for the pre IFRS period are shown in the next table. 
 
Table 5 Pre IFRS Kruskal-Wallis test results France, Netherlands and UK  
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Country N Mean Rank  σNI/σCFO 
UK 621 574,25 Chi-Square 45,586 
France 346 439,55 df 2 
Netherlands 78 485,15 Asymp. Sig. 0,000 
σNI/σCFO 
Total 1.045  a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
    b. Grouping Variable: Country 
 
The mean rank is the highest for UK and lowest for France. A lower mean rank indicates 
lower values of σNI/σCFO. The difference is significant, which means that the country in 
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which a company operates influences the degree of income smoothing. In France and 
Netherlands firms smooth income to a larger extent compared to firms in UK in the pre 
IFRS period. Also the mean σNI/σCFO is higher for UK, as mentioned in section 4.1. These 
findings confirm hypothesis 2a. 
 
Post IFRS 
The same expectations apply for the post IFRS period. Table 6 presents the results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis test.  
 
Table 6 Post IFRS Kruskal-Wallis test results France, Netherlands and UK  
Ranks Test Statisticsa 
 Country N Mean Rank  σNI/σCFO 
UK 239 294,02 Chi-Square 7,451 
France 231 260,17 df 2 
Netherlands 76 249,49 Asymp. Sig. 0,024 
σNI/σCFO 
Total 546  a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
    b. Grouping Variable: Country 
 
Again the mean rank of UK is the highest, followed by France and Netherlands. The degree 
of income smoothing is significantly different across the investigated countries, with 
companies in UK smoothing income less than companies in France and Netherlands. This 
conclusion can also be depicted if the mean ranks of σNI/σCFO for the three countries are 
considered. Hypothesis 2b is thus supported by the results. 
Even in the period after IFRS firms in weak investor protection countries smooth income 
more than firms in strong protection countries. They might do so for different reasons. 
With weak investor protection (e.g. weak public enforcement) opportunistic behaviour is 
less likely to be detected and probably more prevalent.   
 
4.2  Income smoothing and earnings informativeness 
In this section the results of the main model are presented per country. The main model 
for each period is specified below. 
 
Pre IFRS: Rt = b0 + b1EPS2002 + b2EPS2003 + b3EPS2004+ b4R2004 + b5IS2003 + b6IS2003 * EPS2002 +  
b7IS2003 * EPS2003 + b8IS2003 * EPS2004 + b9IS2003 * R2004 + εt  
 
Post IFRS: Rt = b0 + b1EPS2006 + b2EPS2007 + b3EPS2008 + b4R2008 + b5IS2007 + b6IS2007 * EPS2006 +  
b7IS2007 * EPS2007 + b8IS2007 * EPS2008 + b9IS2007 * R2008 + εt  
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Table 7 Results UK 
 Model 
variables Intercept EPSt-1 EPSt EPSt+1 Rt+ 1 ISt 
ISt * 
EPS t-1 
ISt * 
EPSt 
ISt * 
EPSt+ 1 
ISt * 
Rt+1 
Coefficients -0,268 0,018 0,142 -0,032 -0,089 0,014 0,056 0,258 0,507 0,058 
t-statistic  (-9,966) (1,516) (2,585) (-0,408) (-4,129) (0,287) (0,879) (1,395) (2,503) (1,447) 
UK pre 
IFRS* 
P-value 0,000 0,130 0,010 0,683 0,000 0,774 0,380 0,164 0,013 0,148 
Coefficients 0,003 1,121 0,686 2,072 -0,408 0,277 -1,643 1,764 -2,786 0,527 
t-statistic  (0,043) (2,364) (0,697) (2,168) (-2,714) (1,975) (-1,268) (0,827) (-1,617) (1,865) 
UK post 
IFRS** P-value 0,966 0,019 0,487 0,031 0,007 0,049 0,206 0,409 0,107 0,063 
*Adj. R2=0,215 
**Adj. R2=0,165 
  
The coefficient on the interaction between income smoothing and future earnings is the 
one I am interested in (ISt * EPSt+1). For the pre IFRS period this coefficient is significantly 
positive, as predicted. Thus it can be concluded that income smoothing enhances earnings 
informativeness in the pre IFRS period for UK. The value of b7 is also positive but not 
significant. 
For the post IFRS period income smoothing is predicted to improve the information content 
of current stock returns about future earnings to a higher extent than in the pre IFRS 
period for UK. In contrast, b8 is found to be highly negative. However the results are not 
significant and the explanatory power of the model is also lower in the post IFRS period.  
If income smoothing alters information in the post IFRS period, a suitable explanation 
should be provided. It might be possible that IFRS allows for more discretion than UK 
GAAP, which encourages managers to manipulate earnings for opportunistic reasons. 
In the end, the evidence provided does not support hypothesis 3, since the results are 
inconsistent with the predictions and not significant.  
 
Table 8 Results France 
 Model 
variables Intercept EPSt-1 EPSt EPSt+1 Rt+1 ISt 
ISt * 
EPSt-1 
ISt * 
EPSt 
ISt * 
EPSt+1 
ISt * 
Rt+1 
Coefficients -0,348 0,086 0,090 0,013 0,009 0,229 -0,151 0,263 0,483 -0,209 
t-statistic  (-10909) (2,063) (1,464) (0,144) (0,234) (4,110) (-1,021) (1,346) (2,227) (-2,800) 
France 
pre 
IFRS* P-value 0,000 0,040 0,144 0,885 0,815 0,000 0,308 0,179 0,027 0,005 
Coefficients 0,110 1,667 1,116 -0,078 0,207 0,069 -0,791 -0,813 -0,088 -0,116 
t-statistic  (1,660) (3,108) (1,988) (-0,142) (1,106) (0,523) (-0,483) (-0,572) (-0,083) (-0,349) 
France 
post 
IFRS** P-value 0,098 0,002 0,048 0,887 0,270 0,601 0,629 0,568 0,934 0,728 
*Adj. R2=0,224 
**Adj. R2=0,153 
  
 
The key interest coefficient is significantly positive for France during pre IFRS. Income 
smoothing also causes stock return to include more information about current earnings, 
although b7 is not significant.   
In the second period, b8 shows a negative value, but highly insignificant. The same 
conclusion as for UK can be drawn here. In addition b7 is negative, which means that 
income smoothing does not lead to more information about current earnings being 
included in the price, which is unreasonable. 
Although for the post IFRS period the results are not significant, I carefully consider 
hypothesis 4 to be true for France, based on the results for both periods. Income 
 76 
smoothing causes earnings to be less informative after IFRS adoption, I can not conclude 
that income smoothing is garbling in the post IFRS period, since the results are not 
significant. 
 
Table 9 Results Netherlands 
 Model 
variables Intercept EPSt-1 EPSt EPSt+1 Rt+1 ISt 
ISt * 
EPSt-1 
ISt * 
EPSt 
ISt * 
EPSt+1 
ISt * 
Rt+1 
Coefficients -0,232 -0,186 0,295 0,365 -0,291 0,053 0,622 -0,486 0,269 0,065 
t-statistic  (-3,639) (-2,216) (2,687) (1,438) (-2,501) (0,508) (2,007) (-1,233) (0,405) (0,303) 
NL pre 
IFRS* 
P-value 0,001 0,030 0,009 0,155 0,015 0,613 0,049 0,222 0,687 0,763 
Coefficients 0,106 1,066 1,370 0,797 -0,095 0,071 -0,278 1,420 -2,961 0,246 
t-statistic  (1,022) (1,777) (2,186) (1,290) (-0,261) (0,327) (-0,108) (0,664) (-1,942) (0,384) 
NL post 
IFRS** 
P-value 0,310 0,080 0,032 0,201 0,795 0,745 0,915 0,509 0,056 0,702 
*Adj. R2=0,316 
**Adj. R2=0,226 
  
 
For Netherlands b8 is also positive but not significant prior to IFRS. The coefficient on 
current earnings is negative and insignificant. The evidence is not convincing, so I can not 
conclude that income smoothing improves earnings informativeness before IFRS adoption. 
After IFRS, the coefficient on future earnings is highly negative and significant at 10% 
level, which induces that income smoothing is altering information. In contrast, b7 is 
positive but not significant. Given the insignificant results for the pre IFRS period, I 
consider that hypothesis 4 is supported for Netherlands. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
5.1  Conclusions 
First of all I found evidence of higher income smoothing behaviour after the introduction of 
IFRS in UK, France and Netherlands. These results confirm the expectation that IFRS 
standards allow for more managerial discretion. Fair value accounting requires subjective 
judgement. Managers probably use this incentive to smooth income streams.  
Further, in the weak investor protection countries France and Netherlands, firms present 
more stable earnings than in UK, for both periods of time. An explanation is that managers 
in low investor protection countries are more able to hide true firm’s performance for 
stakeholders and act in their own benefit (Cahan et al. 2008).  
The second part of my research, relates to the effect of income smoothing on earnings 
informativeness. In the period prior to IFRS income smoothing causes stock returns to 
contain more information about future earnings for all three countries, with insignificant 
results for Netherlands. Subsequently to IFRS adoption the findings indicate that income 
smoothing decreases earnings informativeness for all the three countries, although the 
results are insignificant for UK and France. This is in accordance to my expectations for 
France and Netherlands but not for UK. Since firms in UK show more stable earning after 
IFRS, it is not only about the degree of smoothness. Like Cahan et al. (2008) suggest, in 
strong investor protection countries firms mainly smooth income to efficiently 
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communicate information about true firm performance, while in weak investor protection 
countries opportunism is the major reason. In the first case, income smoothing should 
improve the value relevance of earnings.  
A possible explanation for the garbling effect of income smoothing in the post IFRS period 
for UK, is that managers act in their own interest. The new standards provide more 
incentives for managers to smooth earnings than the UK GAAP standards probably. 
Managers use this discretion in an opportunistic way, despite of the high level investor 
protection. Another explanation could be that the public enforcement of accounting rules 
in the sample countries also changed after the introduction of IFRS. Or maybe national 
regulators expect more guidance from the European regulatory body (CESR) about how to 
enforce the new IFRS rules. Less strict enforcement would create more incentives for 
managers to deceive. However the results for the post IFRS period are not significant, and 
should carefully be interpreted.  
The degree of investor protection seems to be less important after IFRS adoption. 
Nevertheless this is a suggestive interpretation, since some results are insignificant.  
 
Based on the evidence found no explicit conclusion can be drawn. The differences in the 
degree of income smoothing and earnings informativeness among countries can not be fully 
assigned to just the applied accounting standards, neither to just the institutional factors. 
It is rather a combination of factors, which affects the incentives for income smoothing. 
 
In the end I would like to conclude this discussion by quoting Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008, 
493): 
“…management incentives and national institutional factors play an important role in 
framing financial reporting characteristics, probably more important than accounting 
standards alone. The IASB and the European Commission should now devote their efforts 
to harmonizing incentives and institutional factors rather than harmonizing accounting 
standards.” 
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To summarize, the relation I found between IFRS, investor protection, income smoothing 
and earnings informativeness in this research is as follows.  
 
    UK          France, Netherlands 
        (Strong investor protection)     (Weak investor protection) 
 
 
Pre IFRS                       Low IS      Medium IS 
 
 
    
  Informative earnings  >       Informative earnings 
 
 
Post IFRS               Medium IS                 High IS  
    
 
             
  Uninformative earnings*                      Uninformative earnings* 
 
IS = income smoothing 
* the evidence is not significant 
 
5.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
I acknowledge that my study has some limitations. First of all the interpretation of the 
model is uncertain in an inefficient market, since it assumes market efficiency. Secondly, 
the income smoothing measure might not capture smoothing behaviour accurately. Next, 
the chosen samples include are small compared to prior research. The mandatory adoption 
of IFRS is still recent and the time horizon of data is limited. Fourthly, other factors that 
can influence income smoothing and/or the relation between income smoothing and 
earnings informativeness are not taken into account (e.g. firm size, industry, the growth 
rate of the company, inflation). In the end additional robustness test are not performed.  
In the end future research should be able to better investigate the effect of IFRS adoption 
on income smoothing and earnings informativeness using a bigger sample and omitting the 
implementation period. The influence of institutional factors should be more thoroughly 
investigated and changes in managerial incentives should be identified. 
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